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0. Introduction 
- My research aims to use Peircean ideas to revive contemporary mainstream 
philosophy in the analytic tradition, many of whose key debates  in my opinion  are 
‘stuck’, and increasingly unproductive. 
- An area where such revival is sorely needed is epistemology. I believe this field is 
uncritically wedded to a legacy from Hume which it currently cannot even see clearly 
enough to criticise.  
- This legacy manifests in an absurdly sceptical treatment of modality, according to 
which nothing in our experience could ever teach us about this important dimension 
of truth. Any attempt to challenge this assumption is met with a scary charge of anti-
naturalism: something no contemporary analytic philosopher wants to be. 
Thus Crispin Wright has written, citing Simon Blackburn: 
...‘we do not understand our own must-detecting faculty.’ Not only are we 
aware of no bodily mechanism attuned to modal aspects, it is unclear how such a 
mechanism could work even in principle... (1986, pp. 206-7) 
- ‘Truth-makers’ for modal claims are even placed in other universes allegedly 
entirely spatiotemporally disconnected from this one (Lewis, 1986).  
- Relatedly, in philosophy of mathematics Benacerraf has made a career out of 
invoking a crass fear of Platonism in the claim that the usual “semantics for 
mathematics” does not “fit an acceptable epistemology”, since it: “…will depict truth 
conditions in terms of… objects whose nature, as normally conceived, places them 
beyond the reach of the better understood means of human cognition (e.g. sense 
perception and the like)” (Benacerraf, 1973, p. 667). 
- Mathematics is in fact an ideal place to observe the limitations of the Humean 
legacy, and try to build a better view. For as Peirce observed, following his esteemed 
father, “Mathematics is the science that draws necessary conclusions.” 
- The materials Peirce offers us to do this will include a considerably more rich and 
plausible theory of perception than is found in Hume.  
 
 
 
1. Examples of Diagrams in Which Necessity is Perceived: 
                                                 
1 The sections of this presentation devoted to Hume owe much to previous joint work 
with Professor James Franklin, Department of Mathematics, University of New South 
Wales. The sections on Peirce I am entirely responsible for. 
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Fig. 2. The inside square is half 
the area of the outside 
    Fig 1.  2 × 3 = 3 × 2                         
In each case it seems we can perceive that a mathematical truth is so, and also at the 
same time that it must be so – it is necessarily true. This is remarkable.  
- There has been a recent upsurge of interest in the role of diagrams in 
mathematical reasoning (e.g. Brown 1999, Giaquinto 2007, Mumma 2010: many inspired by 
Manders 2008) and logic (Shin 2002).  
- Peirce of course, with his profound understanding of iconic signs has much to 
offer this movement, since he understood that all necessary reasoning concerns “A 
diagram of our own creation, the conditions of whose being we know all about” 
(Philosophy of Mathematics, p. 19). 
 
2. Hume’s Denial that we May Perceive Necessity 
The reason Humeans deny we may perceive necessity derives from Hume’s 
particular brand of empiricism, and a supposedly common-sense maxim which he 
drew from it: “there are no necessary connections between distinct existences”.  
- This maxim is widely taken for granted today  treated as something like an 
axiom of metaphysics. 
Thus, Hume writes: 
 ‘‘There is no object, which implies the existence of any other if we consider 
these objects in themselves.’’ (Treatise, 1, III, vi) 
“Any thing may produce any thing. Creation, annihilation, motion, reason, 
volition; all these may arise from one another, or from any other object we can 
imagine…no objects are contrary to each other, but existence and non-existence.” 
(Treatise, 1, III, xv)  *Quite remarkable!  
- Consider Hume’s most famous application of his maxim, to so-called causal 
necessity, in the famous passage about billiard balls:  
“I consider, in what objects necessity is commonly suppos’d to lie; and finding 
that it is always ascrib’d to causes and effects, I turn my eye to two objects 
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suppos’d to be plac’d in that relation. . . . I immediately perceive, that they are 
contiguous in time and place, and that the object we call cause precedes the other 
we call effect. In no one instance can I go any farther....” (Treatise, 1, III, xiv) 
i) Note that this is a phenomenological argument 
Hume claims that we suppose that causes and effects are united by “a necessary 
connexion of power, of force, of energy, and of efficacy...”, but nothing in his 
immediate experience corresponds to that. 
ii) What are the ‘objects’ Hume is referring to? 
- Here Hume speaks as if the ‘objects’ are the balls themselves, but he is actually 
talking about their motions. 
- Properties and events must therefore count as ‘objects’ or ‘existences’ for Hume. 
But then, what about the properties ‘black’ and ‘white’? The events of 2 and 3 hours 
passing? Or, to return to mathematics, the ‘objects’ ∅ and {∅}?  
- In an attempt to understand what Hume means by ‘distinct existences’, I turn to 
his theory of perception and the epistemology he twines around it.  
 
3a. Humean Theory of Perception  Epistemology: Passive 
i) Ideas are simple copies of impressions  
ii) Impressions of reflexion consist solely in combinations of impressions of sensation     
 - Sensory impressions are the building blocks of all thought. 
iii) All mental activity is ‘perception-like’  
- Reflexion too is a form of perception  of ideas that are ‘weaker’ and  ‘less vivid’. 
In fact: “To hate, to love, to think, to feel, to see; all this is nothing but to perceive” 
(Treatise 1, II, vi) 
iv) Denial of abstract ideas.  
- Hume defines abstract ideas as ideas that are general in that at least some of 
their  determinable properties lack determination. E.g. a ‘general triangle’: neither 
isosceles or scalene.  
- He claims (following Berkeley) there are no general ideas, only particular ideas 
used in a general way (e.g. a proof about triangles to be valid might need to draw on 
the particular ideas of isosceles and scalene and equilateral triangles...)  
- Allowing abstract ideas would render the mind active since it would need to 
choose which determinables to abstract from. 
   
3b. Humean Theory of Perception  Epistemology : Atomist 
i)  Separate Imaginability Criterion of Distinctness 
- When we distinguish shape from colour in an object such as a white globe, it is 
not that we examine the white globe and use reason to distinguish its whiteness and 
roundess as abstract ideas.  
4 
  
- Rather, what we do is imagine black globes and white cubes.  
- Without such a literal, quasi-perceptual forcing apart of ideas we cannot 
distinguish them, though we might think we can, a cause of much confusion and 
wasted time in philosophy: “...that distinction of reason, which is so much talked of, 
and is so little understood, in the schools.” (Treatise, 1, I, vii) 
- Thus Hume denies that we can prescind without separating: “...all ideas, which 
are different, are separable...” (Treatise, 1, I, vii). This is crucial. 
- To deny this is to allow philosophers to postulate occult qualities – a good 
example is the Aristotelian idea of substance (‘prime matter’): (“…these philosophers 
carry their fictions still farther in their sentiments concerning occult qualities, and 
both suppose a substance supporting, which they do not understand, and an 
accident supported, of which they have as imperfect an idea. The whole system, 
therefore, is entirely incomprehensible…” (Treatise, 1, IV, iii)) 
 
4. Modal Combinatorialism 
- Recall Hume’s remark: “...no objects are contrary to each other, but existence 
and non-existence”   
- This implies that ‘objects’ as he understands them are all compossible – they 
have no natures which might constrain their combination in any way. Thus such 
necessities as do exist in the world may only consist in constant conjunction, nothing 
more ‘binding’.   
- This view has been very influential in C20th philosophy: e.g. Wittgenstein’s 
Tractatus: §1.12:  “Each item can be the case or not the case while everything else 
remains the same”  Carnap  David Lewis. (See also Armstrong, 1989.) 
‘top-down’ combinatorialism: any whole can be decomposed into some given 
set of atomic parts. (*HUME DOESN’T MEAN THIS)  
‘bottom-up’ combinatorialism: given some set of atomic parts, any permutation 
of them is possible. (*HE MEANS THIS) 
This is essentially a denial of real universals. Real universals precisely consist in 
constraints (hopefully intelligible) on the happy combination of any possible thing 
with any possible thing. A physical example: the whole point of the concept of force is 
that it is contrary to certain (unforceful) behaviors.  
 
5. Back to our Examples 
- Reconsider Fig. 1:  
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  Fig 1.   2 × 3 = 3 × 2      
 
Does this constitute a necessary connection between distinct objects? Well, what are 
the objects here? It seems the Humean has a number of choices:   
 
i) Physical Mark View: The relevant objects/existences are: 
5 of these: 
6 of these:  
which go together to make 5 oval + star combinations, such as: 
 
- This appears to be a natural choice in terms of the organisation of our visual field 
when regarding the diagram. Humean Separate Imaginability Criterion of 
Distinctness: we can imagine each of these shapes existing on its own on the page.  
- But then it is false that there are no necessary connections between these 
objects as positioned in fig 1. For instance, one cannot change the number of stars in 
the vertical ovals without changing the number of stars in the horizontal ovals. 
Interpreted thus, then, Hume’s maxim is simply incorrect.  
ii) Abstract Object View: On the other hand, one might claim that fig.1 doesn‘t 
display a truth about physical marks but about something more purely mathematical 
or ideal – for instance the relevant objects are three ‘2s’ and two ‘3s’.  
- These objects are arguably not distinct. E.g. 2 is made up of ‘two ones’ and 3 is 
made up of ‘three ones’, so 2 is a proper part of 3.  
- At this point, then, Hume might defend his maxim by stating that fig 1 only 
expresses relations between ideas.  
- But there is something unsatisfying here. It seems puzzling to claim that we can 
gain mathematical knowledge, as we clearly can, by examining this diagram, and yet 
that mathematical objects are entirely separate from perceived experience.  
- Furthermore, now Hume’s claim: “There is no object, which implies the 
existence of any other if we consider these objects in themselves...”  seems to beg 
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the question. He seems to be arbitrarily ruling out that we perceive the kinds of 
existences between which necessary connections hold, by labelling them as ‘mere 
ideas’.  
- His maxim then effectively becomes: “there are no necessary connections 
between distinct existences, which are those existences between which there are 
no necessary connexions”. This seems to rob it of all philosophical content.  
iii) “Both” view: One might think of compromising by combining the two views as 
follows: the objects represented by fig 1 are ovals and stars and ‘2s’ and ‘3s’.  
- However this raises tricky questions of the relationship between the physical 
marks and the numerical ideas. If they are all separate objects, why include the stars 
and ovals in the diagram at all....? 
- This points the way to our preferred interpretation: 
iv)  “Hybrid...but not both”: Rather than understanding physical marks and 
numbers as separate objects, attribute to them partial identities.  
- What does this mean?  
 
- Just that ‘twoness’ is a property which may be prescinded from this: 
 
 
while precisely not being separable from it. This is of course exactly what Hume’s 
theory of perception (and associated epistemology) rules out as impossible.  
 
- So what kind of theory of perception could do justice to what is clearly going on in 
these mathematical examples? 
 
6. Peirce’s Theory of Perception 
- Enormously different to Hume’s.  
- Forster (Peirce and the Threat of Nominalism) writes that nominalists such as Hume 
take for granted “….that knowledge is grounded immediately in experience of 
particulars.” (p. 109). However this confuses “the question of the nature of 
empirical evidence in inquiry with psychological and metaphysical questions about 
the nature of the mind and its relation to the world” (p. 109). 
- Peirce suggests we need to give separate, though interlocking, accounts of:  
i) immediate experience 
ii) the truth of symbols derived from that experience.  
- The first becomes Peirce’s account of the percept, the second his account of the 
perceptual judgment. 
 
i) The Percept 
- comprises a felt quality and the vividness with which it is presented. Neither of 
these is ‘cognitive’. The percept is not a Humean idea. Nor does it express truth-
claims. Peirce writes that it “…does not stand for anything. It obtrudes itself upon 
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my gaze; but not as a deputy for anything else, not ‘as’ anything. It simply knocks at 
the portal of my soul and stands there in the doorway.” (7.619).  
- Forster: “While the content of a percept is inherent in it apart from everything 
else, the content of a sign is not” (p. 114).   
 
ii) The Perceptual Judgement 
- cannot be a copy of the percept, as they are too unlike one another: …as unlike... as 
the printed letters in a book, where a Madonna of Murillo is described, are unlike 
the picture itself” (5.54). 
- The percept has an integration which cannot be possessed by the perceptual 
judgement, which requires a subject and a predicate. Consider the perception of a 
yellow chair:  
 “The judgement, ‘This chair appears yellow’, separates 
the color from the chair, making the one predicate and the other subject. The 
percept, on the other hand, presents the chair in its entirety and makes no analysis 
whatever” (7.631).  
- The perceptual judgement expresses a proposition, which can be true or false. By 
the same token its interpretation is thrown open to the community of inquiry, to 
which each symbolic judgment properly belongs, namely: “…an endless series of 
judgments, each member of which is logically related to prior members” (p. 120) 
- These inquirers may now develop the meaning of the terms yellow and chair in 
unanticipated ways.  
 
iii) The Relationship between Percept and Perceptual Judgement 
- But now Peirce has so convincingly separated the firstness / secondness of the 
percept from the thirdness of the perceptual judgement – how are we to bridge the 
two? Moreover, how are we to bridge from the uncontrollable in perception to the 
controllable in thought?  
- Don’t we now have a great mystery at the heart of perception? 
- No we do not. The British empiricists (and their downstream followers) are too 
unimaginative in assuming that the only possible relation between percept and 
perceptual judgment is that the latter copies the former.  
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- Rather: percepts cause perceptual judgements, while not being the source of their 
content.  
- How does this happen?  
- The human mind is organised such that each percept causes  “direct and 
uncontrollable interpretations”. (These are sometimes referred to by Peirce, after 
1903, via a third term - the percipuum).  
- This causal process cannot be willed but it can be trained and perfected via the 
cultivation of appropriate mental habits (also known as ‘education’).  
 
iv) Abstract ideas 
We’re all familiar with how Peirce challenges early modern parodies of abstractions 
such as ‘dormitive virtue’. Suffice it to say that prescinding without separating is not 
only possible, but crucial. (Hypostatic abstraction is “...an essential part of almost 
every really helpful step in mathematics.” (1903 lectures, p. 133). 
 
7. Perceiving a Mathematical Diagram    
- So how does all this work in the case of perceiving mathematical necessity? What is 
a mathematical percept? It’s obviously not going to be quite like the percept of a 
yellow chair, so what is it going to be like? 
- Suggest that we take seriously Peirce’s repeated claims that mathematics is as 
experimental a science as physics: “I have sometimes been tempted to think that 
mathematics differed from an ordinary inductive science hardly at all except for the 
circumstance that experimentation which in the positive sciences is so costly in 
money, time, and energy, is in mathematics performed with such facility that the 
highest inductive certainty is attained almost in the twinkling of an eye.” (1903 
Lectures, p.131) 
- The laboratory equipment of the mathematician is the diagram.   
- Let us reconsider fig. 1, in which we perceived that 2 × 3 = 3 × 2 is necessarily true, 
and analyse it in terms of Peirce’s theory of perception. 
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  Fig 1.   2 × 3 = 3 × 2       
 
- The Percept:  The percept for fig. 1 is exceedingly difficult to describe in words, as 
are all percepts. However I will try to convey indirectly something of my 
phenomenological experience when I ’got’ this proof.  
- I had a sudden grasp of the horizontal and vertical arrangements of the stars as one, 
as if the same 5 ovals were ‘holding together’ both arrangements, although that 
‘holding together’ is only a metaphor as those arrangements are not strictly parts of 
the whole diagram (they are not separable, only prescindable). 
- At the same time, looking at the diagram and thinking about other possible 
arrangements of the stars that might be prescinded from it (such as three threes, or 
three fours), I perceived some kind of primitive blocking of those other options. It is 
as if I could feel myself not being able to think of those other options.  
- We might call this primitive blocking or constraint, in homage to Wittgenstein, ‘the 
hardness of the mathematical must’.  
 
- The Percipuum: My fig. 1 percept gives rise to an ‘uncontrollable interpretation’ that 
it shows the necessary truth of: 2 × 3 = 3 × 2.  
- This might seem ‘too easy to say’.  
- But no matter how hard I might try to interpret fig. 1 as, for instance, 2 × 3 = 3 × 3 – 
I just can’t do it. That is a simple fact – I can’t manage to think that way.  (Try it 
yourself...)  
- Thus Peirce writes: “Although mathematics deals with ideas and not the world of 
sensory experience, its discoveries are not arbitrary dreams but something to which 
our minds are forced...” (Philosophy of Mathematics, p. 41).  
 
- Perceptual judgment: The phenomenological ‘hardness of the mathematical must’ 
which was felt by my mind in viewing the diagram now becomes the necessary truth 
of: 2 × 3 = 3 × 2.  
- Felt hardness in the inner world and necessity in the outer world are not the same 
thing. For insofar as the proposition 2 × 3 = 3 × 2 is a symbol, it can now be put to a 
multitude of general uses – for instance drawn on in practical tasks (e.g. food 
rationing), integrated into a broader theory of arithmetic (e.g. “multiplication is 
commutative”)...and so on. 
 
- Occult-hood revisited. 
- We saw that Hume took as definitive of naturalism to avoid positing occult powers 
at all costs. Peirce on the other hand calmly evaluates the phenomena, admits that 
certain powers of the mind are occult, and characteristically, usefully clarifies the 
notion of occultness so that it can do real philosophical work: “[The clustering of 
ideas] is either due to an outward occult power or to an inward one. That it is due 
to some occult power is plain from this, that the ideas although they are in our own 
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minds and thus normally subject to our will. cluster in spite of our will, and that in 
certain regular ways....But it is occult in this sense, that nothing more about it can 
be learned by mere observation of these phenomena.” (Philosophy of 
Mathematics, p. 50). 
   
8. Conclusion     
- Despite analytic philosophers’ bafflement as to how it should be possible, we do of 
course perceive necessity. Perception is in fact the only way in which we gain 
knowledge of necessity, insofar as all necessary reasoning involves experimenting 
upon diagrams. 
- It’s time mainstream philosophy got past its crass horror of Platonism. 
- Peirce’s nuanced theory of perception allows us to see that Hume is interestingly 
right and wrong phenomenologically about perceiving necessity. We might say that 
Hume is correct in his devastating analysis of causal necessity that there is no 
external necessity in his immediate experience (i.e. in his percept). He is just incorrect 
that it follows from this that he is perceiving no such thing in reality (i.e. he has no 
perceptual judgement of it) 
- Hume failed to see this because he failed to understand that ideas are not copies of 
impressions. This was arguably a phenomenological defect in his philosophising. 
 
- I end with a quote by Peirce: a beautiful example of the gloriously enigmatic depth 
of which he was capable: “It is self-evident that every truth of pure mathematics is 
self-evident if you regard it from a suitable point of view” (1903 Lectures, p. 128). 
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